Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent
A General Equilibrium Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9715115 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Daron Acemoglu (0000-0003-0908-7491, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Thierry Verdier (0000-0002-9701-7815, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) |
| Year | 1998 |
| Volume | 108 |
| Issue | 450 |
| Pages | 1381-1403 |
| Publication date | 1998-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00347 |
| OpenAlex | W2103776815 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 69 |
| References cited | 12 |
We consider an economy where contracts are necessary to encourage investments. Contract enforcement requires that a fraction of the agents work in the public sector and do not accept bribes. We find that: (1) It may be optimal to allow some corruption and not enforce property rights fully. (2) Less developed economies may choose lower levels of property right enforcement and more corruption. (3) There may exist a 'free-lunch' such that over a certain range it is possible simultaneously to reduce corruption, increase investment, and achieve a better allocation of talent
Economics · Epistemology · General equilibrium theory · Language change · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Property (philosophy · Property rights · Sociology · Volume (thermodynamics · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic theories and models · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Philosophy
Entrepreneurship and its link to corruption
Causality between corruption and the level of GDP
Corruption, production structure and economic development in developing countries
Corruption And Productivity
Global Trends in Law Enforcement - Theory and Practice
Reward structures and the allocation of talent
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
Property Rights and Economic Development
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development
Inequality, Institutions, and Informality
It's the Economy, Again! Determinants of Corruption in Public Administration
Corruption, anti-corruption, and economic development
Are financial markets resilient to political corruption scandals? Evidence from Latin America
Effect of Government Efficiency on Tax Evasion
Modern slavery, corruption, and hysteresis
The impact of local financial development on firm growth in Vietnam
Organized Crime, Corruption, and Economic Growth
Legal Environment, Finance Channels and Investment
Land scarcity and land access in a hazard‐prone island
Governance and Development
Does Corruption Impact On Firms' Ability To Conduct Business In Mauritania ? Evidence From Investment Climate Survey Data
Corruption, growth and political regimes
Corruption and Economic Growth
Causes and Effects of Corruption
Governance regimes, corruption and growth
The Choice Between Market Failures and Corruption
Corruption, institutions, and economic development
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistle-blowing
Control rights, bureaucratic corruption and the allocation of resources
Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights
Education, corruption, and the distribution of income
Uncertainty, entrepreneurship, and the organization of corruption
Effects of Bribery on Firms' Environmental Innovation Adoption in Vietnam
Behavioral impulses and the transmission channels of their impact on macroeconomic stability
The Implication of Corruption on Economic Progress of Nigeria
Rent seeking and the economics of corruption
"Can Russia Break the "Resource Curse
Two Views of Corruption and Democracy
The accountability dilemma in mass purges
Predicting and explaining corruption across countries
Rent seeking or corruption? An analysis of income satisfaction and perceptions of institutions in Greece
Corruption can cause healthcare deprivation
The Growth Effects of Property Rights
Sorting through global corruption determinants
Government Spending, Corruption and Economic Growth
High corruption income in Ming and Qing China
Economic growth without transformation
Do dependence on fossil fuels and corruption spur ecological footprint
Greasing or Grinding? Regulatory context and the productivity effects of corruption
Economic growth with endogenous corruption
Revolutions and corruption
When Local Models Fail
Rent‐seeking, R&D, and productivity
Shadow Economy, Corruption, and Economic Growth
Declining Predation during Development
Economic Analysis of Corruption
Erosion of State Power, Corruption Control and Fiscal Capacity
Corruption and Indonesia’s Regional Economic Performance
Property, Institutions, and Social Stratification in Africa
A Model of Destructive Entrepreneurship
Measuring Local Corruption in China
The Causal Relationships Between Corruption, Investments and Economic Growth in GCC Countries
The effect of corruption on firm investment in the presence of missing data
Rethinking corruption in contemporary African philosophy
Perceptions of Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation and Delivery Programme
Politicization of Economic Cybercrime
Economic Gender gap in the Global South
Corruption in Emerging Markets
A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
Reward structures and the allocation of talent
The economics of corruption
Political Order in Changing Societies
The Rise of the Western World
Asian Drama
Crime and Punishment
Political Order in Changing Societies
Corruptible Law Enforcers
Taxes and Bribery
Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption
| Unique citing works | 69 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,23 |
| Citation span | 1995 - 2026 (32) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 66 |