Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995–2000

Bibliographic Data

ID9715407
AuthorsAndrew Sweeting (0000-0002-6351-5162, Northwestern University, corresponding author)
Year2007
Volume117
Issue520
Pages654-685
Publication date2007-04-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02045.x
OpenAlexW2055927321
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited13

This article shows that generators exercised considerable market power in the England and Wales wholesale electricity market in the late 1990s. This is surprising because static oligopoly models predict that falling market concentration should have reduced market power. The article tests the equilibrium assumption of these models that each generator's bids should maximise its short-run profits given the bids of other generators. It finds that the two largest generators could have profitably increased their output from the beginning of 1997. Their behaviour was consistent with tacit collusion. Copyright 2007 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2007

Business · Commerce · Economics · Electrical engineering · Electricity · Electricity market · Market economy · Market power · Monopoly · New england · Wholesale market · Electric Power System Optimization · Engineering · Power System Reliability and Maintenance · Transport and Economic Policies

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