Provision of a Public Good with Multiple Dynasties

Bibliographic Data

ID9715467
AuthorsLarry Karp (University of California), Larry S Karp (0000-0001-8779-8139, University of California System, corresponding author)
Year2017
Volume127
Issue607
Pages2641-2664
Publication date2017-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12458
OpenAlexW2184987463
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited52

Because carbon emissions create externalities across countries and generations, climate policy requires international cooperation and intergenerational altruism. A differential game using overlapping generations with intergenerational altruism shows how altruism and cooperation interact, and provides estimates of their relative importance in determining equilibrium steady‐state carbon levels. A small increase in cooperation has a larger equilibrium effect than a small increase in altruism, beginning at empirically plausible levels. A large increase in altruism may have a larger equilibrium effect, compared to a large increase in cooperation. Climate investments may be dynamic strategic complements, reducing but not eliminating incentives to free ride

Altruism (biology · Biology · Climate change · Climate policy · Economics · Externality · Incentive · Microeconomics · Public good · Climate Change Policy and Economics · Ecology · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Global Health Care Issues

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