The Supply of Information by a Concerned Expert

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9715867
AutoresAndrew Caplin (1New York University), John Leahy (0000-0001-5221-0884, 1New York University)
Año2004
Volumen114
Número497
Páginas487-505
Fecha de publicación2004-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.0228a.x
OpenAlexW2099522484
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas10
Referencias citadas10

How much information should a policy maker pass on to an ill‐informed citizen? In this paper, we address this classic question of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in a setting in which beliefs impact utility, as in Kreps and Porteus (1978). We show that this question cannot be answered using a utility function with standard revealed preference foundations. To solve the model, we go beyond the classical model in two respects, relying on the psychological expected utility model of Caplin and Leahy (2001) to capture preferences, and the psychological game model of Geanakoplos et al. (1989) to capture strategic interactions

Decision maker · Economics · Expected utility hypothesis · Function (biology · Management science · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Preference · Revealed preference · Sobel operator · Subjective expected utility · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications