Government Revenues and Economic Growth in Weakly Institutionalised States

Bibliographic Data

ID9716100
AuthorsManuel Oechslin (0000-0002-4798-2991, Tilburg University, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume120
Issue545
Pages631-650
Publication date2010-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02349.x
OpenAlexW2143804688
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited28

The lack of sustained growth in poor countries has often been attributed to 'fiscal weakness'. Empirical evidence suggests that governments often fail to provide crucial public goods. I argue that this failure may be the result of a political instability effect: more resources fuel power struggles among competing elites - and decrease the incumbent regime's time horizon in office. But with a shorter time horizon, it is less attractive to finance growth-promoting institutions whose returns only accrue in the future. The model further predicts the instability effect to be stronger in countries with little capital or in remote places which render technology adoption expensive. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2010

Capital (architecture · Economic policy · Economics · Empirical evidence · Government (linguistics · Market economy · Monetary economics · Neoclassical economics · Political instability · Political science · Politics · Public good · Revenue · Time horizon · Economic Growth and Productivity · Finance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Natural Resources and Economic Development

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