The Distribution of Talent Across Contests

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9716623
AutoresGhazala Azmat (0000-0001-9450-6958, Queen Mary University of London), Marc Möller (0000-0001-5893-2335, University of Bern)
Año2018
Volumen128
Número609
Páginas471-509
Fecha de publicación2018-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12426
OpenAlexW1588316052
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas5
Referencias citadas45

Do the contests with the largest prizes attract the most able contestants? To what extent do contestants avoid competition? We show that the distribution of abilities is crucial in determining contest choice. Complete sorting exists only when the proportion of high‐ability contestants is small. As this proportion increases, high‐ability contestants shy away from competition and sorting decreases, making reverse sorting a possibility. We test our theoretical predictions with a large panel data set containing contest choice over 20 years. We use exogenous variation in the participation of highly able competitors to provide evidence for the relationship among prizes, competition and sorting

Biology · Competition (biology · Competitor analysis · CONTEST · Distribution (mathematics · Econometrics · Economics · Management · Microeconomics · Panel data · Political science · Scramble competition · Set (abstract data type · Sorting · Variation (astronomy · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Mathematics · Sports Analytics and Performance