Target Setting in Tournaments
Theory and Evidence from China
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9716772 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Xing Li (0000-0001-5578-3901, Peking University), Chong Liu (0009-0007-7425-8847, Peking University), Xi Weng (0000-0001-8383-0461, Peking University), Li-An Zhou (Peking University), Li‐an Zhou (0000-0002-8306-9075, Peking University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2019 |
| Volumen | 129 |
| Número | 623 |
| Páginas | 2888-2915 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2019-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uez018 |
| OpenAlex | W2607174438 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 77 |
| Referencias citadas | 34 |
Motivated by the prevalence of economic targets at all levels of territory administration in China, this article proposes a Tullock contest model to study optimal target setting in a multi-layered tournament-based organisation. In our model, targets are used by upper-level officials to convey the importance of economic growth and incentivise subordinates in the tournaments. Our model predicts a top-down amplification of economic growth targets along the jurisdiction levels, which explains the observed pattern in China. Using both provincial and prefectural-level data, we test the model predictions and find consistent evidence
Administration (probate law · China · CONTEST · Economics · Jurisdiction · Microeconomics · Political science · Public economics · Test (biology · Tournament · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
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| Obras citantes distintas | 77 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 12,83 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 76 |