Property Rights

Cooperation, Conflict, and Law

Bibliographic Data

ID9717202
AuthorsSanjit Dhami (0000-0002-3880-7454, University of Leicester, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume114
Issue493
PagesF147-F149
Publication date2004-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.0013-0133.2004.191_5.x
OpenAlexW2136161985
LanguageEN
Citations received6

This book looks at the significance and evolution of property rights. It explores the theme that rational individuals who compete for scarce resources need some rules to regulate and govern the resulting competition. Such rules can possibly include, violence, ‘might is right’, societal norms, or formal and informal property rights defined by some political institutions such as a government. The choice among the many diverse rules is a cost‐benefit decision that applies the standard ‘marginal principle’. The book has thirteen chapters which are in turn organised into six parts. In Part I, Edwin West looks at the views of the classical economists on the issue of property rights; relative to modern neoclassical economics, their emphasis is on the normative basis for property rights. Yoram Barzel argues for the importance of incorporating transaction costs (defined as the resources used to establish and maintain property rights) into the neoclassical competitive model. He also illustrates and extends Cheung’s argument about the difficulty of separating transactions that occur within firms and markets, an issue that lies at the heart of the modern theory of the firm

Argument (complex analysis · Competition (biology · Economics · Government (linguistics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Normative · Political science · Politics · Property (philosophy · Property rights · Transaction cost · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law

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