Disagreement and Learning about Reforms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717469 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Johannes Binswanger (Tilburg University and CentER), Manuel Oechslin (0000-0002-4798-2991, University of Lucerne and CentER) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 125 |
| Issue | 584 |
| Pages | 853-886 |
| Publication date | 2015-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12252 |
| OpenAlex | W3123785662 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 33 |
When it comes to economic reforms in developing countries, many economists agree on broad objectives (such as fostering outward orientation). Broad objectives, however, can be pursued in many di¤erent ways, and policy experimentation is often indispensable for learning which alternative works locally. We propose a simple model to study this societal learning process. The model explores the role of disagreeing beliefs about “what works”. It suggests that this type of disagreement can stall the societal learning process and cause economic stagnation. Interestingly, this can happen even if everybody knows that Pareto-improving reforms do exist. Our analysis is motivated by the empirical observation of a negative relationship between disagreement and economic growth among poorer countries
Economic system · Economics · Epistemology · Neoclassical economics · Pareto principle · Positive economics · Process (computing · Public economics · Simple (philosophy · Computer Science · Economic Growth and Development
Learning about a New Technology
Endogenous Political Institutions
Emergence and Persistence of Inefficient States
The Origins of State Capacity
Second-Best Institutions
Volatility and Development
Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures
The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
Policy Gambles
Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries
Economic development as self-discovery
Social learning in a heterogeneous population
The political economy of linguistic cleavages
Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise
Learning by Doing and Learning from Others
The Self‐Perpetuation of Biased Beliefs
Endogenous Indoctrination
Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform
Giving Credit Where It Is Due
Diagnostics before Prescription
Political Polarization and the Size of Government
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,83 |
| Citation span | 2020 - 2024 (5) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |