Patents As Negotiating Assets
Patenting Versus Secrecy For Startups
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9717484 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andreas Panagopoulos (0000-0002-2021-0641, University of Crete and TECHNIS), In‐Uck Park (0009-0009-3186-7348, University of Bristol and Sungkyunkwan University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 615 |
| Pages | 2876-2894 |
| Publication date | 2018-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12540 |
| OpenAlex | W2740403160 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 23 |
We analyse a sequential innovation model and show that relatively narrow patent rights can facilitate a market in which startups' patents are traded as negotiating assets. In this market, the trade of patents, on top of monopoly profits, conveys an extra surplus from the patents' capacity to affect future tech‐transfer negotiations. This surplus, which stems from a patent's potential ability to exclude infringers and the corresponding enforcement spillovers that patents confer, may incentivise innovations that would not have been possible under trade secrecy, improving social welfare
Business · Commerce · Economic surplus · Economics · Enforcement · Industrial organization · International trade · Market economy · Monopoly · Negotiation · Secrecy · Welfare · Innovation Policy and RD · Intellectual Property and Patents · Law · Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |