Inequality and Inefficiency in Joint Projects
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718422 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Debraj Ray (0000-0002-5840-3051, New York University and Instituto de Análisis Económico, University of Namur), Jean‐marie Baland (0000-0002-7985-2518, New York University and Instituto de Análisis Económico, University of Namur), Olivier Dagnelie (New York University and Instituto de Análisis Económico, University of Namur) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 117 |
| Issue | 522 |
| Pages | 922-935 |
| Publication date | 2007-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02064.x |
| OpenAlex | W2077508234 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 22 |
nA group of agents voluntarily participates in a joint project, in which efforts are not perfectly substitutable. The output is divided according to some given vector of shares. A share vector is unimprovable if no other share vector yields a higher sum of payoffs. When the elasticity of substitution across efforts is two or lower, only the perfectly equal share vector is unimprovable, and all other vectors can be improved via Lorenz domination. For higher elasticities of substitution, perfect equality is no longer unimprovable. Our results throw light on the connections between inequality and collective action.\n
Collective action · Economics · Elasticity of substitution · Inefficiency · Inequality · Joint (building · Mathematical analysis · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Production (economics · Economic theories and models · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics
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| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |