Salaries and Work Effort
An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718548 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Naci Mocan (Louisiana State University NBER), Duha T Altindag (0009-0005-4671-1611, IZA Auburn University) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 123 |
| Issue | 573 |
| Pages | 1130-1167 |
| Publication date | 2013-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12056 |
| OpenAlex | W2045814298 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
| References cited | 36 |
Before July 2009, salaries of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) were paid by their home country, and there were substantial salary differences between MEPs representing different countries. Starting in July 2009, salaries are pegged to 38.5% of a European Court judge’s salary, paid by the European Union. This created an exogenous change in salaries, the magnitude and direction of which varied substantially. Using information on each MEP between 2004 and 2011, we show that an increase in salaries decreases attendance at plenary sessions and reduces the number of questions asked but it has no impact on other job‐related activities
Attendance · Demographic economics · Economic policy · Economics · European union · Labour economics · Parliament · Political science · Politics · Salary · Work (physics · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Economic Policies and Impacts · Law · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
Labor Supply of Politicians
Part-time parliamentarians? Evidence from outside earnings and parliamentary activities
Vivre de la politique
Outside Earnings, Electoral Systems and Legislative Effort in the European Parliament
Do Peers respond? Attendance and critical events
Self-serving legislators? An analysis of the salary-setting institutions of 27 EU parliaments
Legislative Pensions and Re‐election Seeking
Political competition and legislative shirking in roll-call votes
Does remuneration affect the discipline and the selection of politicians? Evidence from pay harmonization in the European Parliament
What does the minister do? On the working conditions of political leaders
Does It Matter How and How Much Politicians are Paid
The effect of multiple-office holding on the parliamentary activity of MPs in the Czech Republic
Effects of age and tenure on MPs’ legislative behaviour in the Czech Republic
When time is money
Dissolution risk and legislative effort of politicians
Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings, Savings, and Consumption
Bad politicians
Paying Politicians
Political careers or career politicians?
Institutions, trade, and growth
Paying politicians
An Empirical Model of Work Attendance
Count Data Models with Variance of Unknown Form
Ugly Criminals
Asymmetric Crime Cycles
Making work pay” in a rationed labor market
Labour supply effects of a cash-for-care subsidy
Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition
Intertemporal Substitution in Labor Supply
An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle Setting
Worker Absenteeism
Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament
New Evidence on the Determinants of Absenteeism Using Linked Employer-Employee Data
Competing on Good Politicians
| Unique citing works | 15 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,25 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 15 |