Learning and Mechanism Design
An Experimental Test of School Matching Mechanisms with Intergenerational Advice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9718718 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tingting Ding (0000-0002-4537-9451, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics), Andrew Schotter (0000-0002-6157-6084, New York University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 623 |
| Pages | 2779-2804 |
| Publication date | 2019-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uez024 |
| OpenAlex | W2947955983 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 36 |
While the mechanisms that economists design are typically static, one-shot games, in the real world, mechanisms are used repeatedly by generations of agents who engage in them for a short period of time and then pass on advice to their successors. Hence, behaviour evolves via social learning and may diverge dramatically from that envisioned by the designer. We demonstrate that this is true of school matching mechanisms—even those for which truth-telling is a dominant strategy. Our results indicate that experience with an incentive-compatible mechanism may not foster truthful revelation if that experience is achieved via social learning
Advice (programming · Economics · Epistemology · Incentive · Matching (statistics · Mechanism (biology · Mechanism Design · Microeconomics · Pedagogy · Revelation · Social learning · Strategic dominance · Test (biology · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,29 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2023 (5) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |