Unemployment and the ‘Labour‐management Conspiracy’
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9719087 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Larry Karp (University of California, Berkeley), Larry S Karp (0000-0001-8779-8139, University of California, Berkeley), Thierry Paul (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Issue | 460 |
| Pages | 113-135 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00493 |
| OpenAlex | W2140131430 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
We study a model in which management and a union bargain over a rule that will later determine the level of employment, and over a wage. The government then chooses an output or an employment subsidy. An exogenous natural turnover rate in the unionised sector creates unemployment whenever the union wage exceeds the competitive wage. Government intervention can increase both the equilibrium amount of unemployment and worsen the intersectoral allocation of labour, because of the induced change in the endogenous wage. Unemployment weakens but does not eliminate the possibility of a 'labour-management conspiracy
Economics · Efficiency wage · Government (linguistics · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Subsidy · Unemployment · Wage · Economic Policies and Impacts · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions
| Highly cited | No |
|---|