Central Bank Transparency
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9719260 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Petra M Geraats (University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2002 |
| Volume | 112 |
| Issue | 483 |
| Pages | F532-F565 |
| Publication date | 2002-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00082 |
| OpenAlex | W2084663935 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 36 |
| References cited | 45 |
Central bank transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy recently. This survey article provides a structured review of the theoretical literature on the consequences of transparency of monetary policy, proposing a distinction between uncertainty and incentive effects of transparency. The theoretical insights are compared to the various ways in which central banks have become transparent in practice. In addition, there is an assessment of the empirical evidence concerning the transparency of monetary policy. Copyright Royal Economic Society 2002
Business · Central bank · Credit channel · Economics · Financial system · Forward guidance · Incentive · Inflation targeting · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Monetary policy · Political science · Public economics · Transparency (behavior · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact
Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy
The Causes of Fiscal Transparency
Transparency and Deliberation Within the Fomc
Mexico's Monetary Policy Communication and Money Markets
Follow What I Do, and Also What I Say
Central bank transparency and shocks
Le pouvoir des mots
On the transparency of the credit reporting system in China
Lack of fiscal transparency and economic growth expectations
Political voice on monetary policy
On the Rationale of Central Bank Transparency, Accountability and Communication
The evolution of central bank communication as experienced by the South Africa Reserve Bank
Contested Meanings of Transparency in Central Banking
Lobbying regulation in Ireland
Opaque transparency
Three different approaches to transparency in monetary policy
Instrumentalizing EMU’s democratic deficit
Central Bank Independence (You Don't Know What You've Got ‘til It's Gone)
Speaking to the people? Money, trust, and central bank legitimacy in the age of quantitative easing
Reputação, credibilidade e transparência da autoridade monetária e o estado de expectativa
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
Accountability and Transparency About Central Bank Preferences for Model Robustness
Apprentissage des préférences des banques centrales
Adding rooms onto a house we love
Les produits financiers peuvent-ils être transparents
Transparence et communication au sein de la Beac
From actual to perceived transparency
Ambiguous political power and contest efforts
Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent
Optimal Degree of Public Information Dissemination
Governing the future
Organizational Reputation, Regulatory Talk, and Strategic Silence
Government Choices of Debt Instruments
Transparência do banco central
The Evolution of Central Bank Governance around the World
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
The Science of Monetary Policy
A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information
The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target
Rules Rather than Discretion
Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences
The Eurosystem
Alice in Euroland
Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government
| Unique citing works | 36 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,64 |
| Citation span | 2004 - 2025 (22) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 36 |