Inverse Campaigning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9719619 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Kai A Konrad (0000-0002-2225-2271, WZB and Free University of Berlin, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue | 492 |
| Pages | 69-82 |
| Publication date | 2004-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00177.x |
| OpenAlex | W4240758914 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 7 |
| References cited | 7 |
It can be advantageous for an ‘office motivated’ party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A’s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties’ rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose a lot and do not benefit small groups of voters who gain a lot
Business · Economic rent · Economics · Inefficiency · Inverse · Microeconomics · Public economics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Mathematics · Politics, Economics, and Education Policy
| Citations per year | 0.35 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2025 (20) |
| Highly cited | No |