Competition, Wages and Teacher Sorting

Lessons Learned from a Voucher Reform

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9719633
AutoresLena Hensvik (Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation and Uppsala Centre for Labour Studies, autor de correspondencia)
Año2012
Volumen122
Número561
Páginas799-824
Fecha de publicación2012-06-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2012.02514.x
OpenAlexW2109734188
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas32

This article examines how the entry of private independent high schools in Sweden affects the mobility and wages of teachers in a market with individual wage bargaining. Using matched employer–employee panel data covering all high school teachers over 16 years, I show that the entry of private schools is associated with higher teacher salaries, also for teachers in public schools. The wage returns from competition are highest for teachers entering the profession and for teachers in maths and science. Private school entry also seems to have increased wage dispersion between high‐ and low‐skilled teachers within the same field

Competition (biology · Demographic economics · Economics · Entry Level · Labour economics · Mathematics education · Panel data · School teachers · Sociology · Sorting · Voucher · Wage · Accounting · Higher Education Research Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Psychology · School Choice and Performance