Optimal Lottery Design for Public Financing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720099 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Akira Maeda (0000-0001-7334-5438, Kyoto University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 532 |
| Pages | 1698-1718 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02186.x |
| OpenAlex | W1981979041 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 26 |
This article develops a model of optimal lottery design for public financing, on the assumption that economic agents view buying lottery tickets as a form of entertainment. Given that lotteries are optimally designed, it offers two findings: (1) the fundraising potential of a lottery is independent of its type (specifically, of whether it is a fixed-prize type or a pari mutuel); and (2) the ratio of the optimal winning prize amount in each prize class to total lottery sales is equalised to the elasticity of demand for lottery ticket purchases with respect to the winning prize in each prize class. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008
Advertising · Business · Class (philosophy · Economics · Entertainment · Lottery · Microeconomics · Political science · Ticket · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Gambling Behavior and Treatments · Housing Market and Economics · Law
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Efficient Rent-Seeking
Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society
Pumpkin Pies and Public Goods
The incidence of overdissipation in rent-seeking contests
Bettors Love Skewness, Not Risk, at the Horse Track
Toward a Theory of Charitable Fund‐Raising
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
On the Optimal Design of Lotteries
Orchestrating Rent Seeking Contests
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |