Games Parents and Adolescents Play

Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9720231
AutoresLing-Xin Hao (0000-0002-4694-0917), Lingxin Hao (John Hopkins University), Joseph Hotz (0000-0002-6958-3318, Duke University), V Joseph Hotz (Duke University and NBER), Ginger Zhe Jin (0000-0001-7912-3780)
Ano2008
Volume118
Fascículo528
Páginas515-555
Data de publicação2008-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02132.x
PMID21660221
PMCIDPMC3109916
OpenAlexW2003715290
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas19
Referências citadas43

This paper examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two-stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalize older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviours in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviours when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model

Demographic economics · Developmental psychology · Drop out · Economics · Game theory · Incentive · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Political science · Repeated game · Reputation · Family Dynamics and Relationships · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Intergenerational and Educational Inequality Studies · Law · Psychology · Social Psychology