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Black Markets and Optimal Evadable Taxation

Bibliographic Data

ID9720310
AuthorsJohn Mclaren (0000-0003-1030-9880, Columbia University, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume108
Issue448
Pages665-679
Publication date1998-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00308
OpenAlexW2092889284
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited12

A simple model of indirect taxation, evasion, and enforcement is presented in which some surprising results emerge. Because of a " ̃market-thinning' effect of high prices, high taxes lead to multiple equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets), and black-market comparative statics tend to give the " ̃wrong' sign. Further, the incentive compatibility constraint for tax compliance is shown to confer a kind of concavity on enforcement costs. As a result, enforcement costs may be minimized by tax rates that vary dramatically between sectors. This consideration is dominant for relatively ineffective tax administrations, so for them the optimal tax system follows a " ̃cash cow' pattern, with one sector bearing all of the tax; but for relatively effective administrations, the optimum follows a slightly modified Ramsey rule. This bifurcation of the parameter space provides one approach to a positive theory of tax systems

Cash · Economics · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Microeconomics · Monetary economics · Optimal tax · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Taxation and Compliance Studies

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Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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