Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9720719 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan de Quidt (Institute for International Economic Studies), Thiemo Fetzer (0000-0002-3471-3469, University of Warwick), Maitreesh Ghatak (0000-0002-6231-5580, London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 128 |
| Issue | 610 |
| Pages | 1019-1046 |
| Publication date | 2018-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12591 |
| OpenAlex | W2799523249 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 14 |
| References cited | 30 |
Motivated by recent controversies surrounding the role of commercial lenders in microfinance, we analyze borrower welfare under different market structures, considering a benevolent non-profit lender, a for-profit monopolist, and a competitive credit market. To understand the magnitude of the effects analyzed, we simulate the model with parameters estimated from the MIX Market database. Our results suggest that market power can have severe implications for borrower welfare, while despite possible information frictions competition typically delivers similar borrower welfare to non-profit lending. In addition, for-profit lenders are less likely to use joint liability than non-profits
Bond market · Business · Economics · Joint and several liability · Liability · Market economy · Market power · Market structure · Microeconomics · Microfinance · Monetary economics · Monopoly · Profit (economics · Welfare · Finance · FinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance · Islamic Finance and Banking Studies · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
Microcredit Under the Microscope
Do Microcredit Loans Do What They Are Intended To Do? A Case Study of the Credit Village Microcredit Programme in China
Market power, social welfare, and efficiency in the Peruvian microfinance
The double bottom line of microfinance
The impact of joint liability lending on leveraging social capital
Refinancing MFIs with market power
Microfinance and dynamic incentives
The role of group size in group lending
Group lending without joint liability
Dynamic microlending under adverse selection
Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance
Optimal (partial) group liability in microfinance lending
Group versus individual liability
Protecting the borrower
The Miracle of Microfinance? Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation
Not-for-profit entrepreneurs
The Economic Returns to Social Interaction
Social Capital and Social Quilts
Trust and Social Collateral
Microcredit Under the Microscope
Returns to Capital in Microenterprises
Time Discounting and Time Preference
Informal insurance in social networks
Estimating the Impact of Microcredit on Those Who Take It Up
The role of group size in group lending
Group lending without joint liability
The supply- and demand-side impacts of credit market information
The economics of lending with joint liability
Group lending and individual lending with strategic default
Competition and microfinance
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
Group versus individual liability
Moneylenders and bankers
Can Social Cohesion be Harnessed to Repair Market Failures? Evidence from Group Lending in Guatemala
Financial performance and Outreach
Using Repayment Data to Test across Models of Joint Liability Lending
The Effect of Social Capital on Group Loan Repayment
Social Connections and Group Banking
Microfinance Meets the Market
| Unique citing works | 14 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,08 |
| Citation span | 2013 - 2025 (13) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 14 |