Knowledge is Power
A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9721069 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jo Thori Lind (0000-0002-2980-3814, University of Oslo), Dominic Rohner (0000-0003-2660-4550, University of Lausanne) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue | 336 |
| Pages | 611-646 |
| Publication date | 2017-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12246 |
| OpenAlex | W3125311869 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 63 |
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behaviour for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory
Economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Perfect information · Political science · Politics · Power (physics) · Public economics · Survey data collection · Voting · Voting behavior · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Law · Media Influence and Politics
What Americans know about politics and why it matters
Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State
Political Competition, Policy and Growth
A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
Why the poor do not expropriate the rich
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
Elections with limited information
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels
Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax
Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Voting over income tax schedules
Polarized America
An economic theory of democracy
How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments
Growth, income distribution, and democracy
The Logic of Collective Action
The Fox News Effect
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
Radio's Impact on Public Spending
Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions
Affluence and Influence
Ethical Voters and Costly Information Acquisition
The changing tolerance for income inequality in the course of economic development
Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition
Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Why Democracies Produce Efficient Results
Press Coverage and Political Accountability
Revisiting Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress, 1947–2007
Earnings Inequality and Welfare Spending
The Immensely Inflated News Audience
The Perverse Consequences of Policy Restrictions in the Presence of Asymmetric Information
Information Acquisition, Ideology and Turnout
Information, Inequality, and Mass Polarization
Uninformed Votes
The Relationship between Information, Ideology, and Voting Behavior
The Changing Tolerance for Income Inequality in the Course of Economic Development
Electoral Competition with Informed and Uninformed Voters
Voting Correctly
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
Political Ignorance and Collective Policy Preferences
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Candidate Motivation
Information Effects in Collective Preferences
Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information
Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |