Perverse Consequences of the Gatt
Export Subsidies and Switching Costs
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9721071 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James C Hartigan (0000-0001-5900-467X, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 249 |
| Pages | 153 |
| Publication date | 1996-02-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2554640 |
| OpenAlex | W2039260765 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 1 |
GATT permits its members to retaliate against unfair trade practices committed by its signatories. However, GATT imposes requirements on this retaliation. These include establishing injury to the pertinent industry in the offended country, requiring that the unfair practice be currently in existence, and mandating that duties not exceed the dumping or subsidy margin. Because the injury requirement gives the foreign government a period lead in introducing the export subsidy, the home government is unable to completely restore the competitive balance when switching costs are present because of these restrictions. Thus, GATT may induce the behavior that it seeks to deter. Copyright 1996 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Balance (ability) · Business · Dumping · Economics · Government (linguistics) · International economics · International trade · Margin (machine learning) · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Subsidy · Global trade and economics · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis · World Trade Organization Law
| Citations per year | 0.14 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2019 - 2019 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |