Waiver, Effectivity and Rights as Game Forms
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9722115 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rajat Deb (0000-0002-7009-0051, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1994 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 242 |
| Pages | 167 |
| Publication date | 1994-05-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2554955 |
| OpenAlex | W2089884913 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 8 |
This paper introduces the concept of a waiver function of a game form: a function that measures the extent to which one can leave choice to others. This is compared with the concept of effectively function used to measure the power of coalitions within a game form. The author shows that under some circumstances either function can be used to capture the notion of rights underlying game forms. Copyright 1994 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Economics · Function (biology) · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Measure (data warehouse) · Microeconomics · Non-cooperative game · Political science · Power (physics) · Screening game · Waiver · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,17 |
| Citation span | 1996 - 2009 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |