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The Simple Economics of Bank Regulation

Bibliographic Data

ID9723256
AuthorsH R Wills (corresponding author)
Year1982
Volume49
Issue195
Pages249
Publication date1982-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2553625
OpenAlexW1986028357
LanguageEN
Citations received4

This paper discusses the effects of central bank regulation of the banking system carried out to control the level of bank lending. Prudential regulation, designed to reduce the frequency of bank failure-a problem in the economics of uncertainty and information-is not considered. The main point of this paper is that bank regulation, in so far as it is effective, and goes beyond the general effects of government intervention in credit markets, can be seen as a tax on transactions intermediated through banks. The variations in the incidence and beneficiaries of the tax provide a convenient framework for the different regulatory schemes. The paper focuses on the effect of regulation on an individual bank. The theory presented here is an elementary comparative static one, based on the equality of marginal cost and marginal revenue. It does not consider the more complicated issues of dynamic control. However, it is unlikely that any policy that has unsatisfactory comparative static properties will be successful. The main ideas of this approach are due to Tobin (1963) and Johnson (1967,197 1). They have been further developed in work by Spencer and Mowl (1978), and Artis and Miller (1978). However, the application of the analysis to the effects of different types of regulation is, I believe, new. A general equilibrium model in the same spirit as the partial equilibrium model used here is given by Fama (1980). The following section presents a simple model of the banking system. Section II discusses the effect of government intervention and regulation, and Section III looks at the way in which government regulation induces disintermediation. Section IV applies the previous results to consider various actual or proposed schemes in practice. The final section draws conclusions

Control (management) · Economic interventionism · Economics · General equilibrium theory · Government (linguistics) · Intervention (counseling) · Marginal cost · Microeconomics · Miller · Monetary economics · Partial equilibrium · Point (geometry) · Revenue · Simple (philosophy) · Accounting · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Economic theories and models

  • Corporate Bank Borrowing in the UK, 1965-1981

    Basil J Moore, Andrew R Threadgold•Economica•1985

  • Precautionary and Speculative Aspects of the Behaviour of Banks in the United Kingdom Under Competition and Credit Control 1972-1980

    Peter D Spencer, Peter Spencer•The Economic Journal•1984

  • The endogeneity of credit money

    Basil J Moore•Review of Political Economy•1989

  • Interest rate restrictions and deposit opportunities for small savers in developing countries

    Paul Burkett•The Journal of Development Studies•1986

Unique citing works4
Citations per year0,1
Citation span1984 - 1989 (6)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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