On the Gains from Tradable Benefits‐in‐kind
Evidence for Workfare in India
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9723290 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Martin Ravallion (0000-0002-5572-4183, Georgetown University and NBER, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 89 |
| Issue | 355 |
| Pages | 770-787 |
| Publication date | 2022-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12413 |
| OpenAlex | W4214821021 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Widely‐used in‐kind benefits are often rationed across potential participants in social programmes. This poses an operational challenge in implementation with limited public information. One possible solution is to randomize assignment given the available information. However, as this paper shows, neither the purposive targeting of in‐kind benefits nor randomized assignment is likely to yield a competitive equilibrium given private information on diverse personal gains. The paper characterizes equilibrium assignments and the implications for policy and evaluation. The theory is applied to an antipoverty programme providing rationed jobs on rural public works in a poor state of India. Special‐purpose survey data reveal large unexploited gains from allowing tradable assignments. The paper shows that the potential gains exceed those from poverty targeting and stylized cash transfer options. Realizing the scope for poverty reduction by such means will undoubtedly require complementary efforts in reducing the influence of other market and institutional factors creating poverty in the first place, including inequalities in access to credit and knowledge
Business · Cash · Cash transfers · Economic growth · Economics · Inequality · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Poverty · Poverty reduction · Public economics · Scope (computer science) · Stylized fact · Workfare · Agricultural risk and resilience · Computer Science · Finance · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Poverty, Education, and Child Welfare
Inequality in India
Transfers in Cash and In-Kind
Causal Inference Using Potential Outcomes
The economics of “tagging” as applied to the optimal income tax, welfare programs, and manpower planning
Does India's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment
Estimating the Benefit Incidence of an Antipoverty Program by Propensity-Score Matching
Understanding Instrumental Variables in Models with Essential Heterogeneity
Workfare versus transfers in rural India
Cash versus direct food relief
A poor means test? Econometric targeting in Africa
Transfer Benefits From Public-Works Employment
Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences
Does Maharashtra's Employment Guarantee Scheme Guarantee Employment? Effects of the 1988 Wage Increase
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |