Self‐enforcing Intergenerational Transfers and the Provision of Education

Bibliographic Data

ID9723368
AuthorsDan Anderberg (0000-0002-2138-4352, University of Stirling), Alessandro Balestrino (0000-0002-5841-1588, University of Pisa)
Year2003
Volume70
Issue277
Pages55-71
Publication date2003-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-0335.d01-47
OpenAlexW3123141144
LanguageEN
References cited24

This paper considers intra‐family financing of human capital under the assumptions that individuals are selfish and binding contracts are not feasible. Cooperation among family members is possible through a family norm (a family ‘social capital’) which prescribes the obligations to be met at each stage in life and sanctions for those who deviate. We characterize the set of self‐enforcing transfers and show that there is a downward bias in the family provision of education. This gives a rationale for public action as a remedy to the lack of commitment between selfish family members

Action (physics) · Business · Economic growth · Economics · Family life · Human capital · Norm (philosophy) · Political science · Public economics · Sanctions · Set (abstract data type) · Social capital · Economic Growth and Productivity · Economic Policies and Impacts · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Law

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