Membership, Seniority and Wage-Setting in Democratic Labour Unions

Bibliographic Data

ID9724206
AuthorsMichael C Burda (0000-0003-0576-9559, corresponding author)
Year1990
Volume57
Issue228
Pages455
Publication date1990-11-01
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2554712
OpenAlexW1986188502
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited11

The dynamic behavior of a democratic monopoly labor union that allocates employment on a length-of-service basis is studied. In the context of a simple model, the author shows that a median voter equilibrium can exist in a union consisting of senority-ranked workers when voting membership depends on past employment. The closed-form wage rule of such a union induces a unit root in the autoregressive representation of employment even if the underlying determinants of labor demand are strictly stationary. On the other hand, "Chesire Cat" or disappearing union phenomena are likely to be limited by the forward-looking behavior of union members and the sensitivity of union membership to employment. Copyright 1990 by The London School of Economics and Political Science

Collective bargaining · Context (archaeology) · Democracy · Economics · Labor union · Labour economics · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Political science · Politics · Representation (politics) · Seniority · Trade union · Voting · Wage · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Law · Merger and Competition Analysis

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