Coordination and Motivation in Flat Hierarchies
The Impact of the Adjudication Culture
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9724467 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rabindra Nath Chakraborty (0000-0001-8577-6315, University of St.Gallen), Ernst Mohr (University of St.Gallen) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 72 |
| Issue | 288 |
| Pages | 563-576 |
| Publication date | 2005-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2005.00432.x |
| OpenAlex | W2167679386 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This paper considers a variation of the partnership game with imperfect public information, in which teams are semi‐autonomous. The only hierarchical intervention in teamwork is when a superior is called in by a team member to adjudicate alleged cases of free‐riding or unjustified lateral punishment (flat hierarchy) according to publicly known adjudicative rules (adjudication culture), using for statistical inference a publicly known organizational norm for teamwork cooperation. It is shown that it is advantageous to set a non‐elitist organizational teamwork norm. Furthermore, fairness in adjudication is valuable for economic reasons alone
Adjudication · Business · Economics · Hierarchy · Imperfect · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Norm (philosophy) · Political science · Sociology · Teamwork · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law
| Highly cited | No |
|---|