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Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple‐Issue Bargaining

Bibliographic Data

ID9724707
AuthorsLutz‐Alexander Busch (University of Waterloo), Ignatius J Horstmann (Western University)
Year1997
Volume64
Issue256
Pages669-680
Publication date1997-11-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-0335.00105
OpenAlexW2018964093
LanguageEN
Citations received3
References cited1

The paper explores how bargaining frictions and bargaining procedures interact to determine players’ bargaining costs in multiple‐issue bargaining settings. When bargaining frictions take the form of discounting and agreements are implemented as they are reached, issue‐by‐issue negotiation can generate bargaining costs different from those that occur if all issues are bargained simultaneously. These cost differences result in differences in allocations across bargaining procedures such that players disagree on the desired method of bargaining. Similar results hold for certain fixed‐cost bargaining friction specifications. This analysis provides a potential explanation of both agenda bargaining and incomplete contracts

Bargaining power · Bargaining problem · Discounting · Economics · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Political science · Wage · Wage bargaining · Finance · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Merger and Competition Analysis

  • Multi-Issue Bargaining and Linked Agendas

    Ignatius J Horstmann, Ignatius Horstmann et al.•National Bureau of Economic…•2001

  • Cores of Combined Games

    Open Access•Francis Bloch, Geoffrey de Clippel•SSRN Electronic Journal•2009

  • Multi-attribute decision-making in individual and social choice

    Open Access•Walter Bossert, Hans Peters•Mathematical Social Sciences•2000

  • Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

    Ariel Rubinstein•Econometrica•1982

Unique citing works3
Citations per year0,12
Citation span2000 - 2009 (10)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 3

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