Rational Ritual
Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9725733 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tilman Börgers (0000-0003-4247-2471, University College London, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 284 |
| Pages | 689-691 |
| Publication date | 2004-11-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | REVIEW |
| Review of | Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge, Michael Suk-Young Chwe, 2013 |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.395_1.x |
| OpenAlex | W2081374637 |
| Language | EN |
Citation · Library science · Sociology · Computer Science · Economic Theory and Institutions · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
Targeted Society
Vaccine misinformation and social determinants of vaccine intentions during a pandemic
Strategy and experience required
Follow the majority? How voters coordinate electoral support to secure club goods
Norm Perception as a Vehicle for Social Change
Criminal rituals
The Broader Political Significance of Houses of Worship
Experience, communication, and collective action
Why Social Relations Matter for Politics and Successful Societies
Kin terms and fitness interdependence
Interfaith Maqāṣid as Religious Value Syncretism
The Political Economy of Religious Property Rights
Labor conflict within foreign, domestic, and Chinese-owned manufacturing firms in Ethiopia
Perfect conformity to observable minimal rituals engenders trust
The Norm-Activating Power of Celebrity
Institutions and cultural capacity
Religious Protection from Populist Violence
The electoral consequences of mass religious events
Terrorism as theater
The Strategic Foundations of Political Sovereignty
How to Close the Gender Gap in Political Participation
How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument
Opposing Power
Benefactors and the Polis
Governing Culture ‘Credibly’
Culture and Order in World Politics
| Highly cited | No |
|---|