The Effect of Sanctions on Exit from Unemployment

Evidence from Denmark

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9726326
AutoresMichael Svarer (0000-0002-6711-4622, Aarhus University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2011
Volumen78
Número312
Páginas751-778
Fecha de publicación2011-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditorialWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0335.2010.00851.x
OpenAlexW1761954794
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas19
Referencias citadas11

This paper investigates the effect of sanctions of unemployment insurance benefits on the exit rate from unemployment for a sample of Danish unemployed. The findings are that even moderate sanctions have rather large effects. For both males and females, the exit rate increases by more than 100% following an imposition of a sanction. The paper exploits a rather large sample to elaborate on the basic findings. It is shown that the effect of sanctions wears out after around three months and that some groups of unemployed are more responsive to sanctions than others

Danish · Demographic economics · Economics · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Political science · Sample (material) · Sanctions · Unemployment · Unemployment rate · Economic Policies and Impacts · Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Law