Why Monopolists Prefer to Make Their Goods Less Durable
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9726817 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Kaushik Basu (0000-0002-3705-055X, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 1988 |
| Volumen | 55 |
| Número | 220 |
| Páginas | 541 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1988-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2553915 |
| OpenAlex | W2107788928 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
| Referencias citadas | 2 |
This paper considers goods that depreciate in terms of quality over time and permits consumers to differ in their attitude concerning the usability of a durable good after it has depreciated. Given this, it is shown that even if a monopoly can costlessly increase the durability of its product, it may choose not to do so. This does not happen in competition. Copyright 1988 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Business · Competition (biology) · Consignment · Durable good · Economics · Microeconomics · Monopoly · Product (mathematics) · Quality (philosophy) · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Digital Platforms and Economics · Marketing · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |