Insider Power, Unemployment Dynamics and Multiple Inflation Equilibria
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9727116 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ben Lockwood (0000-0002-2402-1514), Apostolis Philippopoulos |
| Año | 1994 |
| Volumen | 61 |
| Número | 241 |
| Páginas | 59 |
| Fecha de publicación | 1994-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | No |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Editorial | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2555049 |
| OpenAlex | W2081266267 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 5 |
| Referencias citadas | 11 |
This paper incorporates employment dynamics due to insider power into the Barro-Gordon theory of inflation. Unlike in the static Barro-Gordon case, and even though our infinitehorizon model is linear-quadratic, there can be two Markov-perfect equilibria, so that the same unemployment may correspond to either low or high inflation. Both equilibrium inflation rates (measured per unit of the gap between the insiders' and government's employment targets) are higher than the corresponding rate in the static case. The low inflation equilibrium has intuitive comparative-statics properties, in that inflation is increasing in insider power and the discount factor, but the high inflation equilibrium behaves in the opposite way. The highinflation equilibrium can be eliminated by a (future) precommitment to a fixed inflation regime (e.g. ERM), but only if this precommitment can be made with certainty. Contrary to the static model, inflation may be lower when the union puts a positive weight on a wage target than when it cares only about employment, even when this wage target is consistent with a lower employment level than the employment target
Dynamics (music) · Econometrics · Economics · Inflation (cosmology) · Insider · Keynesian economics · Macroeconomics · Physics · Political science · Power (physics) · Thermodynamics · Unemployment · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy · Monetary Policy and Economic Impact · Psychology
Designing Monetary Policy when Unemployment Persists
Hybrid Inflation‐Price‐Level Targeting in an Economy With Output Persistence
Unemployment Persistence and the Sustainability of Exchange Rate Pegs
Conservative Central Banks and Nominal Growth, Exchange Rate and Inflation Targets
The Clash of Central Bankers with Labour Market Insiders, and the Persistence of Inflation and Unemployment
Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
History Versus Expectations
Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models
Rules Rather than Discretion
A Dynamic Model of Trade Union Behaviour
On Union Preferences and Labour Market Models
Unemployment
Imperfect Competition, Underemployment Equilibria and Fiscal Policy
The Dynamics of Inflation with Constant Deficit Under Expected Regime Change
Dynamic Wage-Employment Bargaining with Employment Adjustment Costs
Hysteresis and the European Unemployment Problem
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 0,18 |
| Intervalo de citas | 1998 - 2018 (21) |
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 4 |