Reaffirming the Existence of "Reasonable" Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions

Bibliographic Data

ID9727487
AuthorsPaul A Samuelson (corresponding author)
Year1977
Volume44
Issue173
Pages81
Publication date1977-02-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2553553
OpenAlexW2022820235
LanguageEN
Citations received21
References cited2

It is a pity that David Ricardo is not alive to tell us whether he would agree with Pierro Sraffa's 1960 proposed 'standard commodity as a good approach to Richardo's desired standard measure of value. Fortunately, Abram Bergson and I are alive and kicking and available to record our reactions to recent axioms proposed by Kemp and Ng (1976) (who refer to a similar unpublished 1973 Washington University paper by R. R. Parks) as reasonable for an ethical system of individualistic BergsonSamuelson type to satisfy. Let me record at beginning, after careful reflection and consultation with various authorities, following reactions. (a) I must regard Axiom 3 of Kemp-Ng as anything but reasonable to impose a Bergson-Samuelson Individualistic Social Welfare Function (B-S ISWF). As Oscar Wilde might put it, For any ethical observer to understand Axiom 3 is to reject it. I believe that Plato, Aristotle and Hobbes would be interested in Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ideal democracy. I doubt that such ethical philosophers as Bentham, Kant, Sidgwick or Rawls would be jarred by Kemp-Ng impossibility theorem, once they perceive how it transparently follows from gratuitous Axiom 3. (b) Granted that I or any writer in Bergson tradition would not wish to adopt proferred Axiom 3 and that jury would approve of this considered decision, what about semantic question of whether post-1938 writers in that tradition have seemed to use words, individual tastes are to count or to be respected and words the B-S ISWF is to be purely 'ordinal' and not at all 'cardinal' , in such a way as to imply that Kemp-Ng Axiom 3 does validly obtain? If this semantic indictment could be sustained-and some research in relevant writings leads me to believe that it cannot be-the charge would not be a serious one: in almost forty years, it seems to have occurred to only three sophisticated people to be led astray! As Pareto used to say, who would ever let substantive matters be determined by philology? In any case, since question of word usage has been raised, Kemp and Ng article provides an appropriate occasion to clarify record sense in which B-S ISWF is to be understood to ordinally depend on ordinal preferences of individuals. My later discussion deals with this matter. (c) Granted that ethical systems will not wish to be restricted by Axiom 3 and that their wording is clear (or made clear) that, there is no reason why those economists engrossed in theory may not wish to explore other social choice functions than those of proposed ethical

Arrow · Arrow's impossibility theorem · Axiom · Economics · Epistemology · Impossibility · Individualism · Jury · Mathematical economics · Pity · Political science · Social choice theory · Social welfare function · Value (mathematics) · Welfare · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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