Employer cooperation, productivity and wages

New evidence from inter‐firm formal network agreements

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9727809
AutoresFrancesco Devicienti (0000-0002-1406-2152, University of Turin‐ESOMAS Department, Collegio Carlo Alberto, IZA, LABORatorio Riccardo Revelli, IRCrES‐CNR, CIRET), Elena Grinza (0000-0002-8978-634X, University of Turin‐ESOMAS Department, CEBRIG‐ULB, LABORatorio Riccardo Revelli, autor correspondente), Alessandro Manello (0000-0002-6921-2621, University of Turin‐ESOMAS Department, IRCrES‐CNR), Davide Vannoni (0000-0002-5145-8156, University of Turin‐ESOMAS Department, Collegio Carlo Alberto, IRCrES‐CNR)
Ano2025
Volume92
Fascículo365
Páginas1-41
Data de publicação2025-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEconomica (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12553
OpenAlexW4403035651
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas59

Using uniquely rich administrative matched employer–employee data for Italy from 2008 to 2018, we investigate the impact of firms' formal network agreements (FNAs) on firm performance and employee wages. We find an overall significant and economically relevant positive effect of FNAs on various measures of firm performance, but there are no tangible benefits for the workers, and wages decrease slightly, on average. There is, however, marked heterogeneity in the impact on both firms and workers. Estimated rent‐sharing equations, as well as other tests that exploit unionization data, suggest that the negative effects on wages can be explained by a decrease in workers' bargaining power following the introduction of FNAs

Business · Economics · Industrial organization · Labour economics · Macroeconomics · Productivity · Firm Innovation and Growth · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions