Information and Enforcement in Informal Credit Markets
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9727884 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Parikshit Ghosh (Delhi School of Economics), Debraj Ray (0000-0002-5840-3051, New York University and University of Warwick) |
| Ano | 2016 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Fascículo | 329 |
| Páginas | 59-90 |
| Data de publicação | 2016-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecca.12169 |
| OpenAlex | W2234399619 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 13 |
| Referências citadas | 43 |
We study loan enforcement in informal credit markets with multiple lenders but no sharing of credit histories, and derive the dynamics of loan size and interest rates for relational lending. In the presence of a sufficient fraction of ‘natural defaulters’, the rest of the market can be incentivized against default by micro-rationing—sharper credit limits and possibly higher interest rates that serve as gateways into new borrowing relationships. When there are too few natural defaulters in the market, this can be supplemented by macro-rationing—random exclusion of some borrowers. When information collection is endogenized, multiple equilibria may arise
Business · Enforcement · Financial system · Political science · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Microfinance and Financial Inclusion
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| Obras citantes distintas | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,48 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1999 - 2022 (24) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 6 |