Skip to main content

ETHNOS_APP

Home • Search • Journals • List 0

Consumption Sharing and Non-Exclusion Rules

Bibliographic Data

ID9728226
AuthorsRobert D Tollison (corresponding author)
Year1972
Volume39
Issue155
Pages276
Publication date1972-08-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2551842
OpenAlexW1991295812
LanguageEN
Citations received6

The theory of public goods, which emphasizes various degrees of sharing in the consumption of common outputs, more or less implicitly assumes that individuals are indifferent as to the persons with whom they combine in sharing arrangements. Under this assumption the theory of public goods has been applied to various problems of governmental and private organization (e.g. fiscal federalism and the theory of clubs) which involve determination of the size of the group over which the common output will be shared. Buchanan in particular has pointed out the potential restrictiveness of this assumption and emphasized that it may be appropriate to attempt to incorporate the element of personal selectivity or discrimination into the analysis of public-goods sharing arrangements.2 This paper is an attempt to incorporate the element of discrimination into an economic model of consumption sharing-basically Buchanan's theory of clubs. The justification for this attempt is that discrimination is a more realistic assumption about human behaviour for a theory of public goods from which to draw implications for public policy.3 A good example is presented by non-discrimination laws applying to publicly provided goods which must be shared in consumption (e.g. public education). The application of some of these laws represents an attempt to determine the composition of sharing groups for particular public outputs.4 In this paper an attempt is made to develop a model of consumption sharing that includes a discrimination variable, and it is used to discuss 1 I am grateful to James M. Buchanan for originally suggesting the importance of the problems addressed in this paper and for much critical assistance with earlier drafts. Discussions with Thomas D. Willett were also very helpful in improving the paper. Specific acknowledgment should also be made of Ryan C

Consumption (sociology) · Economics · Element (criminal law) · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Private good · Public economics · Public good · Restrictiveness · Sociology · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law

  • A Note on Consumption Sharing and Non-Exclusion Rules

    Yew-Kwang Ng, Yew‐kwang Ng et al.•Economica•1974

  • Europa als ein Club voller Clubs

    Open Access•Reto Schemm-Gregory•Europa Als ein Club Voller Clubs•2010

  • A Theory of Disriminatory Clubs */Sp>

    Open Access•Allan C De Serpa•Scottish Journal of Political…•1977

  • The shape of public choice to come

    Open Access•William C Mitchell•Public Choice•1993

  • A note on providing public goods through voluntary contributions

    Open Access•Clarence C Morrison•Public Choice•1978

  • Impure Public Goods, Relative Gains, and International Cooperation

    Open Access•Matthew J Costello•Policy Studies Journal•1996

Unique citing works6
Citations per year0.12
Citation span1974 - 2010 (37)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub
Ethnos_APP • Open Source Project • MIT License • Frontend v2.0.0 • Privacy and Cookies • API Documentation: api.ethnos.app/docs • API Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17049435 • Frontend Source Code: GitHub • DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.17050053 • cruz.rio.br • Expectantes Misericordiae