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Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem

Bibliographic Data

ID9728476
AuthorsLeonardo Felli (0000-0001-6113-6014, London School of Economics and Political Science, corresponding author), Kevin Roberts (Nuffield College; Oxford)
Year2016
Volume83
Issue329
Pages172-200
Publication date2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEconomica (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ecca.12170
OpenAlexW1563669557
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited29

Aggregate (composite) · Competition (biology) · Coordination failure · Economics · Industrial organization · Inefficiency · Investment (military) · Matching (statistics) · Microeconomics · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal principles and applications

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    Paul A Grout•Econometrica•1984

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  • Learning, Wage Dynamics, and Firm-Specific Human Capital

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  • The Costs and Benefits of Ownership

    Sanford J Grossman, Oliver Hart et al.•Journal of Political Economy•1986

  • Competing Premarital Investments

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  • Market Microstructure and Incentives to Invest

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Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,2
Citation span2016 - 2019 (4)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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