Umbrella Pricing to Attract Early Entry
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9728526 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Claude Crampes, Abraham Hollander |
| Year | 1993 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 240 |
| Pages | 465 |
| Publication date | 1993-11-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2554573 |
| OpenAlex | W2055085148 |
| Language | EN |
An incumbent firm engages in a strategy of umbrella pricing to ward off the development of an advanced technology by a prospective entrant. As a result, the competitor enters the market with an old technology less harmful to the established firm. Both firms benefit from umbrella pricing but static as well as dynamic welfare is reduced. Copyright 1993 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Business · Dynamic Pricing · Economics · Industrial organization · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Welfare · Firm Innovation and Growth
| Highly cited | No |
|---|