Self‐reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement when there are Criminal Teams
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9728606 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eberhard Feess (0000-0002-8365-8048), Markus Walzl (0000-0003-3732-7755, Maastricht University) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 283 |
| Pages | 333-348 |
| Publication date | 2004-08-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Economica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0427 • E-ISSN: 1468-0335 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0013-0427.2004.00374.x |
| OpenAlex | W3125675845 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 11 |
We extend the analysis of self‐reporting schemes to criminal teams. When the violators behave non‐cooperatively, maximum deterrence can be reached at virtually no cost by designing a prisoners' dilemma. One drawback of such a scheme is that it might induce cooperative behaviour in the self‐reporting stage. If the cooperation rate is increasing the benefits from cooperation, it is optimal to impose less than the maximum fine if both individuals self‐report. The same result occurs for imperfect self‐reporting technologies where the conviction of one agent does not necessarily lead to a conviction of his accomplice
Business · Computer security · Conviction · Criminal Conviction · Criminal law · Deterrence (psychology) · Deterrence theory · Dilemma · Economics · Enforcement · Imperfect · Law and economics · Law enforcement · Microeconomics · Perfect information · Political science · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
| Citations per year | 0.1 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2006 - 2017 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |