The Man and the Institution

This is a mixed blessing. Minimum institutional development both helps and hinders the President's affairs. At the helpful end of the scale, he enjoys exceptional freedom of action in dealing with his Cabinet. He can, if he chooses, abstain from calling it into session. He can drastically reduce the measures which come before it and blithely ignore its strongest recommendations. The British Prime Minister, in contrast, must consult his Cabinet at almost every turn and through precisely delineated procedures. But the minimum institutional development also works to the disadvantage of the President. He has, for example, strikingly fewer and far less consequential means than the British Prime Minister for eliciting his party's support, especially in the legislature. In consequence, the President suffers in his proposals to Congress defeats that are inconceivable in Great Britain. Witness Truman's Fair Deal and the very minor percentage of it which Congress got around to approving-though, to be sure, his recommendations in the field of foreign affairs were more favorably received. The relationship between the man and the institution has been an enduring problem of the Presidency. The Founding Fathers, in their act of creating the office, were much preoccupied with it, being haunted by George III and his system of personal government, with its blunders, extravagance, and corruption. As they sought through institutional means to diminish the hazards of the Presidential personality, several variations of a council were considered to share in the President's decisional activity. Only after extended consideration was this general formula dropped. The electoral college was established presumably to screen the safest personalities from among the aspirants to office. Under the principle of the separation of powers, a strong legislature was established so that although the President might propose policy, Congress would dispose of it. The list of measures could be extended. Yet there were also strong forces at Philadelphia pushing for an executive of independent strength, and to a large degree these forces prevailed. Throughout our 167 years of experience with the Presidency, the problem of the relationship between the man and the institution has reappeared in various forms. Today it deserves to be regarded as one of the central problems of the Presidency. The problem may be stated thus: How can the Presidency of the future, occupied as it will be with men of uneven talents, be continuously able to meet the challenges of the times? It is assumed that the military, diplomatic, and economic problems of the country will be of such urgency as to require a continuously effective executive. The record of the Presidency raises a serious question concerning its capacity to provide continuous leadership of high caliber. Although there are the striking accomplishments of Washington, Jack

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• Moving Beyond the Oval Office

  Joseph A Pika•Congress & the Presidency•1981

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