The Evolution of Firm Lobbying in American Politics
Testing Theories of Lobby Activity and Centrality (1999–2018)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9782005 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marcel Hanegraaff (0000-0003-0971-1864, University of Amsterdam, corresponding author), Ellis Aizenberg (0000-0001-5311-5635, Leiden University), D Valeeva (0000-0002-2777-8635, University of Amsterdam) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Publication date | 2026-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Political Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1234 • E-ISSN: 1469-2112 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0007123426101409 |
| OpenAlex | W7151290172 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 43 |
This research note investigates how the involvement of firms in American politics has developed over the past two decades. The central question is whether individual firms have become more active lobbyists compared to business associations in the US Congress over this period. Different subdisciplines in political science have various expectations regarding the evolution of firm lobbying. We test which perspective is most accurate. To evaluate the hypotheses, we use a novel dataset comprising approximately 180,000 instances of lobbying activity by different types of interest organizations across a wide range of sectors and issues. In our analyses, we trace both the relative activity of firms versus business associations and their centrality in lobbying networks. While most theoretical models in the literature suggest a rise of firm lobbying activity, our results highlight a strikingly stable pattern of firm lobbying activity and centrality within the US political system over the past two decades
Centrality · Perspective (graphical) · Politics · Test (biology) · TRACE (psycholinguistics) · Elite Sociology and Global Capitalism · Policy Transfer and Learning · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Networks
Social Network Analysis
Firm Interests
The Population Ecology of Interest Representation
The Business of America is Lobbying
Corporate Political Activity
Brokering Health Policy
The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy
The Fracturing of the American Corporate Elite
Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification
What do campaign contributions buy? Lobbyists’ strategic giving
The two worlds of lobbying
Time is of the Essence
Bringing the middleman back in
WTO Judicial Politics and EU Trade Policy
New trade, new politics
Interpreting Environments
The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade
Is politics under increasing corporate sway? A longitudinal study on the drivers of corporate access
Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons
Capital united? Business unity in regulatory politics and the special place of finance
Lobbying after 9/11
Testing Theories of American Politics
Sisyphus Meets the Borg
Ties that count
Why firms lobby more alone than collectively
Globalizing the Supply Chain
Interest Group Access to the Bureaucracy, Parliament, and the Media
Does group engagement with members constitute a “beneficial inefficiency
"Business" Is Not an Interest Group
Information and Influence
Counteractive Lobbying
The Population Ecology of Interest Group Formation
Political Cleavages within Industry
The Determinants of Industry Political Activity, 1978-1986
Campaign Contributions and Access
Disaggregating and Explaining Corporate Political Activity
Community, market, state-and associations
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |