Do complement clauses with first- or third-person perspective support false-belief reasoning? A training study with English-speaking 3-year-olds
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9787384 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ditte Boeg Thomsen (0000-0001-7387-0443, University of Copenhagen, autor de correspondencia), Birsu Kandemirci (0000-0002-9422-0279), A L Theakston (0000-0002-9483-7893), Silke Brandt (0000-0003-3363-8740, Lancaster University) |
| Año | 2025 |
| Volumen | 61 |
| Número | 6 |
| Páginas | 1044-1062 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2025-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | Developmental Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0012-1649 • E-ISSN: 1939-0599 |
| Editorial | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/dev0001808 |
| PMID | 39418474 |
| OpenAlex | W4403509498 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 1 |
To investigate whether acquisition of the perspective-marking grammar of complement-clause constructions supports progression in children's false-belief reasoning, we conducted a training study with 76 English-speaking 3-year-olds from the North-West of England (age range: 3;0-3;10 years, 50% female, 80% White). Children were randomly assigned to one of three maximally comparable training conditions, and in a 4-week eight-session program, all children participated in the same training activities with mental-state contrasts. Depending on condition, activities were mediated linguistically with either simple clauses, first-person complements, or third-person complements. The study addressed critical confounds in previous training studies by avoiding the use of complement clauses in false-belief tests and controlling individual differences in memory, executive functioning, general language, and pretest proficiency with complement clauses. The results yielded strong support for the hypothesis of a causal influence of complement-clause exposure on false-belief progression, as children trained with first-person complements advanced significantly more in false-belief reasoning from pretest to posttest than children trained with simple clauses. Examining the roles of first- and third-person complements, a direct comparison between progression in the two complement-clause conditions showed no significant difference, but only children trained with first-person complements progressed significantly more than children in the control condition trained with simple clauses. Follow-up analyses suggested that first- and third-person complements each support false-belief progression at different stages of development. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved)
Cognitive psychology · Complement (music · Developmental psychology · Perspective (graphical · Perspective-taking · Training (meteorology · Artificial Intelligence · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Natural Language Processing Techniques · Psychology · Social Psychology · Speech and dialogue systems
| Obras citantes distintas | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 1 |