True or false
Do 5-year-olds understand belief
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9789253 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William V Fabricius (Arizona State University, corresponding author), Ty W Boyer (0000-0001-9844-802X, Indiana University), Amy A Weimer (0000-0003-4981-2133), Kathleen M Carroll (0000-0003-3263-3374, Arizona State University), Kathleen Carroll |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1402-1416 |
| Publication date | 2010-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Developmental Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-1649 • E-ISSN: 1939-0599 |
| Publisher | American Psychological Association (APA) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1037/a0017648 |
| PMID | 21058830 |
| OpenAlex | W2047022780 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 16 |
| References cited | 8 |
In 3 studies (N = 188) we tested the hypothesis that children use a perceptual access approach to reason about mental states before they understand beliefs. The perceptual access hypothesis predicts a U-shaped developmental pattern of performance in true belief tasks, in which 3-year-olds who reason about reality should succeed, 4- to 5-year-olds who use perceptual access reasoning should fail, and older children who use belief reasoning should succeed. The results of Study 1 revealed the predicted pattern in 2 different true belief tasks. The results of Study 2 disconfirmed several alternate explanations based on possible pragmatic and inhibitory demands of the true belief tasks. In Study 3, we compared 2 methods of classifying individuals according to which 1 of the 3 reasoning strategies (reality reasoning, perceptual access reasoning, belief reasoning) they used. The 2 methods gave converging results. Both methods indicated that the majority of children used the same approach across tasks and that it was not until after 6 years of age that most children reasoned about beliefs. We conclude that because most prior studies have failed to detect young children's use of perceptual access reasoning, they have overestimated their understanding of false beliefs. We outline several theoretical implications that follow from the perceptual access hypothesis
Cognition · Cognitive development · Cognitive psychology · Developmental psychology · False belief · Perception · Theory of mind · Child and Animal Learning Development · Educational Strategies and Epistemologies · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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The knowledge (“true belief”) error in 4- to 6-year-old children
Dissociating visual perspective taking and belief reasoning using a novel integrated paradigm
Does think mean the same thing as believe? Linguistic insights into religious cognition
In defense of a developmental dogma
Knowledge first
The developmental paradox of false belief understanding
Knowledge-first mentalizing
Mindreading with ease? Fluency and belief reasoning in 4- to 5-year-olds
In defense of pluralist theory
Assertoric mindreading
Forgetting common ground
The Comprehensive Assessment of Theory of Mind (CAT)
Why Do Children From Age 4 Fail True Belief Tasks? A Decision Experiment Testing Competence Versus Performance Limitation Accounts
Young children's conceptions of knowledge
| Unique citing works | 16 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2025 (16) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 16 |