The problem with neoclassical institutional economics
A critique with special reference to the North/Thomas model of pre-1500 Europe
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9814213 |
|---|---|
| Authors | A J Field (0000-0003-4864-5388, Santa Clara University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1981 |
| Volume | 18 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 174-198 |
| Publication date | 1981-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Explorations in Economic History (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-4983 • E-ISSN: 1090-2457 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/0014-4983(81)90025-5 |
| OpenAlex | W1965038795 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 79 |
| References cited | 12 |
Appeal · Discipline · Economics · Epistemology · General equilibrium theory · Macroeconomics · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Politics · Positive economics · Proposition · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics · Work (physics · Computer Science · Historical Economic and Legal Thought · Historical Economic and Social Studies · Law · Philosophy
Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts
A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
Some Concluding Reflections on the Privatization of Common Property Resources
The Property Rights School Solution
Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
The Unregulated Common Property
Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
Theories of Sharecropping
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions
Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Natural Resources and Economic Growth
Recent Changes Affecting Collective Action at Village Level
Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
The Possibility of Co‐Operation
The Regulated Common Property
Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
Co‐Ordination and Leadership in the Unregulated Common Property
The Tragedy of the Commons
Were People Traditionally Conservationists?
Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization
Rural Credit Markets
The Economic theory of agrarian institutions
Moral Norms and Co‐Operation
Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
General Conclusion
Co‐Management as a New Approach to Regulation of Common Property Resources
Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes
Halting Degradation of Natural Resources
Environmental Implications of International Trade and Uneven Development
Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
International Institutions
Credit and Agrarian Class Structure
The Evolution of Institutions
Meanings of methodological individualism
Conforontation in Toronto
What was wrong with the old institutional economics (and what is still wrong with the new)
Transactions, transaction costs, and vertical integration
What is wrong with the new institutional economics (and what is still wrong with the old)
Carl Menger's theory of the evolution of money
Institutions, Naturalism and Evolution
Institutional economic theory
Institutional innovation and agricultural development
The theory of induced institutional innovation
The New Institutional Economics and its applicability to development
Peasants and the market
Behind the market stage where real societies exist ‐ part II
Behind the market stage where real societies exist ‐ part I
Toward a theory of induced institutional innovation
Contrasting origins of the two institutionalisms
The Economics of Political Integrity
Regional fairs, institutional innovation, and economic growth in late medieval Europe
Perspectivas de futuro en historia económica
Forging a Labor Market in Urban China
Economic Growth and Institutions
The evolution of agrarian institutions
Do legal systems matter
Property rights in economic history
The growth and decay of custom
Realism Theory and Individualism in the Work of Carl Menger
Institutionalism and the European Union
State Building, Interstate and Intrastate Rivalry
Public goods and political institutions
Accumulation, regulation, and social change
International institutions and the new economics of organization
Agrarian Capitalism, Property Rights, and Rural Class Behavior
Cultural Belonging, Structural Location and Human Action
When Actors Comply
New Institutional Economics and economic history
Exchange relations between lords and peasants
An Introduction to "Money Economy and Modern Civilization" by Wesley C. Mitchell
The Moral or the Rational Peasant? Competing Hypotheses of Collective Action
The nature and historical evolution of an exceptional fiscal state and its possible significance for the precocious commercialization and industrialization of the British economy from Cromwell to Nelson
Town and country
Path dependency, or why Britain became an industrialized and urbanized economy long before France
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication
The Rise of Serfdom in Eastern Europe
The Chronology Of Labour Services
The Rise and Fall of A Theoretical Model
The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System
Marx as a Student of Technology
Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe
The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom
The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology
| Unique citing works | 79 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,84 |
| Citation span | 1983 - 2011 (29) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 79 |