The Battle for Moscow, Turning Point of the War

UNTIL the summer of 1941 the German Wehrmacht had gone from success to success; all of the operations which it had launched were brilliant in conception and execution. Poland, Norway, France and the Balkans were the scenes of great triumphs. It is true that Hitler had cast longing eyes across the English Channel and had directed preparations for an invasion of England. Yet the fact that this was not attempted appeared to confirm that the German High Command knew the measure of the attainable and weighed carefully the chances of victory. Then like a bombshell came the news on June 22, 1941, that Germany had launched a surprise assault on her treaty partner, the Soviet Union. All long-range preparations for this campaign, which had received the code name Barbarossa, had been made for a target date in the middle of May 1941. This time for launching the operation remained unchanged during the winter 1940-41 while the German Balkan campaign (Marita) was planned. Marita was limited originally to the occupation of northern Greece, to support the bogged-down Italian offensive in Albania; and in accordance with the Adolf Hitler directive of March 17, the forces provided for it were not to be con sidered in the deployment against Russia. Moreover, the opening date for Barbarossa suffered no postponement when, on Hitler's order of March 22, the Balkan campaign was extended, as a result of the British landings in Greece, to include all of Greece inclusive of the Peloponnesus. widely accepted belief that the British intervention in Greece resulted in a postponement of the opening date of Barbarossa is not valid. Events in Jugoslavia did delay it, however. Jugoslav Government which had joined the Three Power Pact on March 25 fell as a result of a coup d'?tat in Belgrade two days later. Hitler at once decided on the campaign against Jugoslavia. forces earmarked for the Balkan campaign had now to be in creased considerably and nine of the support divisions provided for Barbarossa were taken for this purpose. On April 3, three days before the beginning of the Balkan campaign, the Armed Forces High Command concluded: The open ing date for Barbarossa will be delayed at least four weeks as a result of the Balkan operations. A further postponement of about ten days ensued when the German deployment was delayed by unusually heavy rains during May. Even so, certain of the forces employed in the Balkan campaign, among others the air forces which participated in the capture of the island of Crete, were late in ar riving on the Russian front. There can be no doubt that the loss of almost six weeks of precious summer weather had a decisive and ominous effect on the out come of the eastern campaign. A fundamental difference in the concept of the German General Staff and that of Hitler came to light early in the operational planning for the Russian campaign. General Staff planned the disposition of two large operational

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