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Constitutional Aspects of the Independence of the European Central Bank

Bibliographic Data

ID9928046
AuthorsPhilip Brentford (corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume47
Issue1
Pages75-116
Publication date1998-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational and Comparative Law Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-5893 • E-ISSN: 1471-6895
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0020589300061571
OpenAlexW2149114466
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

At the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome 1957 on 26 March 1997, Romano Prodi, President of the Italian Council, said that, with the Maastricht Treaty “we are perfecting our common economic constitution”, and that this Treaty should not be seen simply as an “instrument for the introduction of the single currency, but also as the awakening of the European peoples to the necessity of setting limits on the action of governments”. This notion of constitution or of economic constitution has received much attention from European legal scholars within the ongoing debate on constitutionalism and constitutionalisation within the Community legal order. However, constitutionalisation presents us with semantic difficulties, as legal doctrine has to adapt itself to the specificity of Community law. The discussion is further complicated by the divergence of views on the subject of whether the Treaties are a constitution for Europe and, indeed, whether Europe needs a constitution. Before we consider what constitutionalisation signifies, the notion of a constitution and an economic constitution in Community law merit consideration

Constitution · Constitutional law · Constitutionalism · Democracy · Doctrine · Economics · European integration · European union · Independence (probability theory · Maastricht Treaty · Political science · Politics · Treaty · Treaty of Rome · European Monetary and Fiscal Policies · European Union Policy and Governance · Law · Legal Language and Interpretation

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    Alexis De Tocqueville, Alexis Charles Henri Maurice Clérel De Tocqueville et al.•The Two Narratives of Political…•2010

  • Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision

    Open Access•Joseph H H Weiler•European Law Journal•1995

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    Open Access•René Smits•International and Comparative Law…•1996

  • Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational Constitution

    Open Access•Eric Stein•American Journal of International…•1981

  • Federalism, Courts and Legal Systems

    Trevor C Hartley•The American Journal of…•1986

  • The Effectiveness of European Community Law

    Open Access•Francis Snyder•Modern Law Review•1993

  • The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany

    Markus D Dubber, David P Currie•American Journal of Legal History•1996

  • Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state

    Fritz W Scharpf•Journal of European Public Policy•1997

  • Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism

    Koen Lenaerts•The American Journal of…•1990

Unique citing works1
Citations per year0.25
Citation span2022 - 2022 (1)
Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 1

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