The Principle of Separation and the Law of Neutrality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9931355 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthew Parish (0009-0002-0048-8723, University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 91-121 |
| Publication date | 2025-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | International and Comparative Law Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-5893 • E-ISSN: 1471-6895 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0020589325000089 |
| OpenAlex | W4409304629 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
The recent rise of ‘qualified neutrality’ has proven highly controversial. Some have suggested that the separation between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello under international law may prevent the reform of ‘traditional neutrality’ into qualified neutrality. This article will seek to resolve academic debate on this topic, arguing that the principle of separation is of limited relevance to perpetuation and reform within the law of neutrality. Although the principle of separation is prima facie incompatible with qualified neutrality, it does not have the required characteristics as a legal rule to inhibit reform of the law of neutrality and the recognition of qualified neutrality as a positive rule under international law
Economics · Law and economics · Neutrality · Political science · Separation (statistics · Statistics · International Law and Human Rights · Law · Mathematics
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |