Indirect Expropriation and the Protection of Public Interests

Bibliographic Data

ID9933873
AuthorsChristian Riffel (0000-0002-4105-7324, University of Canterbury, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume71
Issue4
Pages945-974
Publication date2022-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueInternational and Comparative Law Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0020-5893 • E-ISSN: 1471-6895
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0020589322000343
OpenAlexW4306871399
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited3

This article analyses what is widely known as the police powers exemption found in modern international investment agreements, with a focus on mega-regional trade and investment agreements. It explores its legal nature and requirements, the burden of proof and issues of compensation. In an attempt to curb (indirect) expropriation claims, the exemption carves out non-discriminatory regulatory measures from the scope of indirect expropriation and in such situations no compensation needs to be paid. It follows that, as a rule, foreign investors are not protected against the adverse economic effects of regulatory measures. The key question addressed is whether host States can increase the level of protection given to public welfare objectives through the use of this exemption without having to compensate investors for the measures taken. The article argues that, under the proportionality test embodied in the exemption, States can provide the level of protection that they desire without incurring a risk of liability as regards expropriation claims

Business · Compensation (psychology · Economic policy · Economics · Eminent Domain · Expropriation · Investment (military · Law and economics · Liability · Market economy · Political science · Public economics · Public welfare · Scope (computer science · Tort · Corporate Law and Human Rights · Finance · International Arbitration and Investment Law · International Law and Human Rights · Law

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